This same dynamic could hold true in the development of an AI Coordination Regime, where actors can decide whether to abide by the Coordination Regime or find a way to cheat. Finally, Jervis[40] also highlights the security dilemma where increases in an actors security can inherently lead to the decreased security of a rival state. Here, values are measured in utility. (5OP,&|#5Y9/yU'4x r+g\t97ASNgQ+Oh iCcKzCx7<=nZefYt|.OPX:'.&|=_Ml_I{]+Mr`h+9UeovX.C; =a #/ q_/=02Q0U>#|Lod. 9i Finally, I discuss the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory in practice. [11] This Article conceptualizes a stag hunt in which the participants are countries that host extractive companies on their stock exchanges, including the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, the Member States . In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not forsovereigntyreasons, or because they areexperiencinggreat economic gain. Such a Coordination Regime could also exist in either a unilateral scenario where one team consisting of representatives from multiple states develops AI together or a multilateral scenario where multiple teams simultaneously develop AI on their own while agreeing to set standards and regulations (and potentially distributive arrangements) in advance. In this section, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. The field of international relations has long focused on states as the most important actors in global politics. Finally, in the game of chicken, two sides race to collision in the hopes that the other swerves from the path first. 0 The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. [17] Michele Bertoncello and Dominik Wee, Ten ways autonomous driving could redefine the automotive world, Mcikinsey&Company, June 2015, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/ten-ways-autonomous-driving-could-redefine-the-automotive-world (suggesting that driverless cars could reduce traffic fataltiies by up to 90 percent). 0000018184 00000 n This democratic peace proposition not only challenges the validity of other political systems (i.e., fascism, communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism), but also the prevailing realist account of international relations, which emphasises balance-of-power calculations and common strategic interests in order to explain the peace and stability that characterises relations between liberal democracies. As described in the previous section, this arms race dynamic is particularly worrisome due to the existential risks that arise from AIs development and call for appropriate measures to mitigate it. HtV]o6*l_\Ek=2m"H)$]feV%I,/i~==_&UA0K=~=,M%p5H|UJto%}=#%}U[-=nh}y)bhQ:*&#HzF1"T!G i/I|P&(Jt92B5*rhA"4 [23] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Pathways to Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons, United Nations, October 23, 2017, https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/pathways-to-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons/. Both actors are more optimistic in Actor Bs chances of developing a beneficial AI, but also agree that entering an AI Coordination Regime would result in the highest chances of a beneficial AI. [5] As a result, it is becoming increasingly vital to understand and develop strategies to manage the human process of developing AI. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI. [8] If truly present, a racing dynamic[9] between these two actors is a cause for alarm and should inspire strategies to develop an AI Coordination Regime between these two actors. In the stag hunt, what matters is trust Can actors trust that the other will follow through Depends on what they believe about each other, What actors pursue hinges on how likely the other actor is to follow through What is Game Theory theory of looking strategic interaction I will apply them to IR and give an example for each. The stag may not pass every day, but the hunters are reasonably certain that it will come. But, after nearly two decades of participation in the countrys fledgling democratic politics, economic reconstruction and security-sector development, many of these strongmen have grown invested in the Afghan states survival and the dividends that they hope will come with greater peace and stability. The best response correspondences are pictured here. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a . Both nations can benefit by working together and signing the agreement. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Prisoners Dilemma game. Together, the likelihood of winning and the likelihood of lagging = 1. Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. Rousseau recognized that the ine cient outcome hunting hare may result, just as conict can result in the security dilemma, and proceeded to provide philosophical arguments in favor of the outcome where both hunters . Discuss. Like the hunters in the woods, Afghanistans political elites have a great deal, at least theoretically, to gain from sticking together. As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. The Stag-hunt is probably more useful since games in life have many equilibria, and its a question of how you can get to the good ones. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. However, if one doesn't, the other wastes his effort. The remainder of this subsection looks at numerical simulations that result in each of the four models and discusses potential real-world hypotheticals these simulations might reflect. On the face of it, it seems that the players can then 'agree' to play (c,c); though the agreement is not enforceable, it removes each player's doubt about the other one playing c". In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a game in Deadlock. a N-person stag hunt dilemmas Jorge M. Pachecol'*, Francisco C. Santos2, Max O. Souza3 and Brian Skyrms4 . If the regime allows for multilateral development, for example, the actors might agree that whoever reaches AI first receives 60% of the benefit, while the other actor receives 40% of the benefit. At key moments, the cooperation among Afghan politicians has been maintained with a persuasive nudge from U.S. diplomats. Course blog for INFO 2040/CS 2850/Econ 2040/SOC 2090, Link: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. Next, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. Here, both actors demonstrate a high degree of optimism in both their and their opponents ability to develop a beneficial AI, while this likelihood would only be slightly greater under a cooperation regime. Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. The payoff matrix would need adjusting if players who defect against cooperators might be punished for their defection. As stated, which model (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) you think accurately depicts the AI Coordination Problem (and which resulting policies should be pursued) depends on the structure of payoffs to cooperating or defecting. An approximation of a Stag Hunt in international relations would be an international treaty such as the Paris Climate Accords, where the protective benefits of environmental regulation from the harms of climate change (in theory) outweigh the benefits of economic gain from defecting. startxref [44] Thomas C. Schelling & Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control. As is customary in game theory, the first number in each cell represents how desirable the outcome is for Row (in this case, Actor A), and the second number represents how desirable the same outcome is for Column (Actor B). A relevant strategy to this insight would be to focus strategic resources on shifting public or elite opinion to recognize the catastrophic risks of AI. @scR^}C$I3v95p6S'34Y1rar{SQ!#fzHBM6 K4m|OOpa7rB'~Y(A|'vh=ziN/quu~6,{Q An hour goes by, with no sign of the stag. "Game Theory for International Accords." endstream endobj 12 0 obj <>stream For example, in a scenario where the United States and Russia are competing to be the one to land on the moon first, the stag hunt would allow the two countries to work together to achieve this goal when they would have gone their separate ways and done the lunar landing on their own. These remain real temptations for a political elite that has survived decades of war by making deals based on short time horizons and low expectations for peace. Use integration to find the indicated probabilities. She argues that states are no longer Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production. Within the arms race literature, scholars have distinguished between types of arms races depending on the nature of arming. Meanwhile, the escalation of an arms race where neither side halts or slows progress is less desirable to each actors safety than both fully entering the agreement. The first technology revolution caused World War I. As discussed, there are both great benefits and harms to developing AI, and due to the relevance AI development has to national security, it is likely that governments will take over this development (specifically the US and China). Formally, a stag hunt is a game with two pure strategy Nash equilibriaone that is risk dominant and another that is payoff dominant. The stag hunt differs from the prisoner's dilemma in that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria:[2] one where both players cooperate, and one where both players defect. (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). First, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. Two, three, four hours pass, with no trace. From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. As an advocate of structural realism, Gray[45] questions the role of arms control, as he views the balance of power as a self-sufficient and self-perpetuating system of international security that is more preferable. This could be achieved through signaling lack of effort to increase an actors military capacity (perhaps by domestic bans on AI weapon development, for example). To begin exploring this, I now look to the literature on arms control and coordination. Meanwhile, both actors can still expect to receive the anticipated harm that arises from a Coordination Regime [P_(h|A or B) (AB)h_(A or B)]. Overall, the errors overstated the companys net income by 40%. 2 Examples of states include the United States, Germany, China, India, Bolivia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. [40] Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30, 2 (1978): 167-214. Collision isdisastrousfor everyone, but swerving is losing bad too. Rabbits come in the form of different opportunities for short-term gain by way of graft, electoral fraud, and the threat or use of force. [51] An analogous scenario in the context of the AI Coordination Problem could be if both international actors have developed, but not yet unleashed an ASI, where knowledge of whether the technology will be beneficial or harmful is still uncertain. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. We see this in the media as prominent news sources with greater frequency highlight new developments and social impacts of AI with some experts heralding it as the new electricity.[10] In the business realm, investments in AI companies are soaring. international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention'. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. Table 13. Why do trade agreements even exist? Continuous coordination through negotiation in a Prisoners Dilemma is somewhat promising, although a cooperating actor runs the risk of a rival defecting if there is not an effective way to ensure and enforce cooperation in an AI Cooperation Regime. It would be much better for each hunter, acting individually, to give up total autonomy and minimal risk, which brings only the small reward of the hare. endstream endobj 76 0 obj <>stream [13] Tesla Inc., Autopilot, https://www.tesla.com/autopilot. The ongoing U.S. presence in Afghanistan not only enables the increasingly capable Afghan National Security Forces to secure more of their homeland, but it also serves as a very important political signal. The matrix above provides one example. It is not clear whether the errors were deliberate or accidental. {\displaystyle a>b\geq d>c} The Stag Hunt 2,589 views Aug 6, 2020 A brief introduction to the stag hunt game in international relations. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. The hedge is shared so both parties are responsible for maintaining it. A sudden drop in current troop levels will likely trigger a series of responses that undermine the very peace and stability the United States hopes to achieve. Type of game model and prospect of coordination. The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. which can be viewed through the lens of the stag hunt in for an example the countrys only international conference in International Relations from, Scenario Assurance game is a generic name for the game more commonly known as Stag Hunt. The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, presented the following In this scenario, however, both actors can also anticipate to the receive additional anticipated harm from the defector pursuing their own AI development outside of the regime. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. Structural Conflict Prevention refers to a compromosde of long term intervention that aim to transform key socioeconomic, political and institional factors that could lead to conflict. [2] Tom Simonite, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race, Wired., September 8, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/. This technological shock factor leads actors to increase weapons research and development and maximize their overall arms capacity to guard against uncertainty. The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations.
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